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Abstract 
 
This paper looks at the results of the Referendum on the United Kingdom membership to the 
European Union in order to test the link between the internationalisation of the local economy 
and the openness of the local society as factors associated with the ‘Leave’ vote (Brexit). The 
paper compares a number of alternative explanations put forward in the public debate after the 
Referendum. The empirical analysis suggests that the outcome of the referendum can be linked 
to an increasing tension between the ever increasing internationalisation of local firms and the 
‘localistic’ attitude of their employees. Brexit can be seen as the result of a process of ‘split 
Europeanisation’ whereby Euroscepticism is triggered by the increasing mismatch between 
internationalised economies (and corporate economic interests) and localistic societies (and 
workers’ attitudes and cultural preferences). 
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 2 
Introduction 
 
June 23
rd
 2016 will always be remembered as a date which sent shockwaves not only throughout 
the United Kingdom (UK) but throughout Europe and the world. The referendum on the UK 
membership to the European Union (EU) delivered a largely unexpected result, starting the 
process that will (presumably) lead to the departure of the UK from the EU (also known as 
“Brexit”) in March 2019.  Following this historical turning point, analysts and scholars around 
the world, started asking themselves two key questions: 1. Why did this happen? 2. What will be 
the likely consequences of this event? Answering either question in full constitutes an enormous 
challenge for social scientists. Before addressing the latter question beyond speculation, we will 
need to wait until the consequences of the actual UK departure from the EU will unfold over 
time. Conversely, it is already possible (and much needed) to address the former question by 
looking at some key facts and figures on the social, economic and behavioural conditions that 
influenced voting patterns and shed new light on the underlying ‘dis-integration’ forces that 
might, in different shapes or forms, affect other EU countries. This paper aims to contribute to 
this endeavour by focusing on the Brexit Referendum results and linking them with the 
internationalisation and openness of the local economic and social environment of the UK 
regions.  
 
In the days and months following the Brexit vote, several hypotheses have been put forth on the 
reasons behind the referendum results. Commentators have pointed their fingers towards 
demographic variables (such as age and education) or towards a response to increasing 
immigration and pressures on social services. Although it is now apparent that the Brexit vote 
was indeed influenced by age and education factors – with younger and better educated voters 
choosing to remain in the EU – other explanations have more limited support in simple 
descriptive data. Indeed, high-immigration constituencies were more likely to vote in favour of 
continued EU membership. Conversely, many areas receiving high shares of EU funds – a 
relevant source of public spending in deprived regions – overwhelmingly supported Brexit. The 
multiplicity of factors influencing Brexit votes and the lack of explanatory power of individual 
variables call for more nuanced explanations.  
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This paper aims to give a more thorough picture of the localized factors behind the Brexit vote 
by testing the hypothesis that one of the reasons behind the outcome of the Brexit Referendum is 
the inherent tension between the ‘internationalisation of production’ and the ‘(lack of) 
globalisation of society’. While UK firms (including those located in areas where the ‘leave 
vote’ prevailed) are highly globally inter-connected, the same is not true for the local workforce 
that lacks in non-local social connections and cultural ties. This fundamental tension between the 
internationalisation of production and the localistic social environment of many areas might be a 
stronger predictor for anti-EU votes, reflecting a more fundamental fracture in the process of 
European integration (“split Europeanisation”) between Europeanised regional economies and 
Eurosceptic societies.  
 
Together with the many non-academic pieces looking at various correlations between the 
percentage of leave voters and factors such as age, education, political affiliation, presence of 
migrants and so on, a growing number of academic papers have attempted to give a more 
comprehensive and multifaceted view of the reasons motivating the Brexit vote, among which 
the most notable contributions are Becker et al. (2016), Goodwin and Heath (2016), Harris and 
Charlton (2016), Arnorsson and Zoega (2016), and Manley et al. (2017). However, the 
innovative contribution of our paper is twofold. First, we model more explicitly the role of firms’ 
internationalisation by using inward and outward FDI as well as the Los et al.'s (2017) index of 
regional exposure to EU trade. Second, we explicitly compare economic internationalisation with 
local social openness as a key explanation for the Referendum results. 
 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the status quo of the research on 
the drivers of the Brexit vote. Section 3 describes the simple empirical exercise, followed by a 
description of the data. Section 4 presents the results and discusses them. Finally, Section 5 
concludes and provides some reflections for EU policy actions.  
 
 
1. What we know (or do we?) about the causes of Brexit 
 
Some of the key questions floating around in the days after Brexit were: why did this happen? 
Who are the ‘Brexiters’? All national and international newspapers provided several 
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interpretations of the phenomenon pointing at some common characteristics of the voters who 
opted for the ‘Leave’ option. It became clear that the electorate was split according to 
demographic characteristics, most importantly age and education. The percentage of voters in 
favour of Brexit increased monotonically with age, going from only 27% of the group aged 18-
24 to 60% of those aged 65+
2
, while, conversely it decreased monotonically with education. The 
main story that was told was one of cultural values, with an insurmountable generational gap 
between the younger generation (more “Euro-philes”) and the older generation more attached to 
traditional British values and more xenophobic (see Burn-Murdoch, 2016 among others).  
 
The emphasis on cultural priors and values – all factors hard to affect by means of public policies 
at any level – offers limited insights on how further political tensions towards international 
disintegration and isolation can be mitigated in the UK and in other EU member states. This 
approach tends to downplay the importance of economic factors as drivers of voting behaviour at 
the Referendum. Some authors went as far as to explicitly discard any economic dimension 
behind the vote, defining Brexit as a purely cultural/psychological phenomenon
3
. In his 
commentary whose title reads “It’s NOT the economy, stupid: Brexit as a story of personal 
values”, Kaufmann (2016) claimed that the key factor in voting to leave the EU was identity and 
that in explaining Brexit “age, education, national identity and ethnicity are more important than 
income and occupation”. According to Hobolt and Wratil (2016), control over immigration was 
considered the most important issue for Leave voters, while economic arguments were 
considered less or not relevant for their voting decision. These views align with the one of other 
influential commentators, such as Scruton (2016), arguing that, in choosing ‘Leave’, UK voters 
were expressing their attachment to an inward-looking form of national collective identity – in 
opposition to the one of those supporting the global, outward-looking European integration 
project – and demonstrating their discontent with what they perceived as a deprivation of 
national sovereignty. Scruton (2016) considers immigration, the EU democratic deficit and the 
effect of the European courts on the law and customs of the British people as the main factors 
having influenced the Leave vote. All these arguments resonate with Goodhart’s (2017) 
                                                     
2
 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-36616028, accessed last on April 20th 2017. 
3
 Such approach, explaining the Brexit outcome exclusively on the basis of cultural motivations, resonates with the 
literature analysing voters’ attitudes towards the EU and arguing that these are mainly rooted in their cultural 
identity (e.g. Carey, 2002; McLaren, 2002; Sides and Citrin, 2007). 
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dichotomy between the ‘anywheres’, i.e. a minority of British people, culturally and socially 
dominant in the country, mobile, highly-educated, with ‘achieved’ identities, more prone to vote 
Remain, and the ‘somewheres’, i.e. the relative majority of UK citizens, older and less well 
educated, more rooted in their geographical identity, finding the rapid changes of the modern 
world unsettling, and more inclined towards Leave.  
 
The initial academic contributions analysing the determinants of Brexit have indeed confirmed 
the role of political, cultural, and demographic elements as fundamental drivers of voting 
choices. Clarke and Whittaker (2016), Arnosson and Zoega (2016), Manley et al. (2017) and 
Harris and Charlton (2017) confirmed the ‘age and education effects’ on the probability of voting 
to leave the EU. Harris and Charlton (2017) also found that having an intermediate or low-skilled 
occupation (traditionally associated with lower human capital) significantly increased the 
chances of having voted for Brexit. Clarke and Whittaker (2016) and Arnosson and Zoega 
(2016) also emphasise the relevance of immigration in conditioning the Referendum vote, a 
result in line with Langella and Manning (2016) who identified immigration and demographic 
factors as key elements behind Brexit. Along similar lines, Hobolt (2016) claimed that favouring 
Brexit was common among the less-educated, poorer and older voters, and among those who 
express concerns about immigration and multi-culturalism. Finally, Goodwin and Heath (2016) 
highlighted the close relationship between support for the UK Independence Party (UKIP) – a 
political party with a clear eurosceptic and anti-immigration platform
4
 – and Leave votes at the 
Referendum, adding that public support for Brexit was more polarised by education level than 
support for UKIP has ever been. 
 
However, conceptual perspectives motivating Brexit exclusively on the basis of cultural issues 
(identity, national sovereignty, etc.) have been regarded by some as inadequate in describing the 
geography of the Brexit vote in an exhaustive way (Los et al., 2017). This alternative view 
claims that variables accounting for the economic conditions of citizens and the economic 
                                                     
4
 The UK Independence Party is a “British political party [which] espouses a populist libertarian philosophy centred 
on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union” (Encyclopaedia Britannica accessed in June 
2017 at https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-Kingdom-Independence-Party). On the relevance of immigration 
concerns and euroscepticism among UKIP supporters see Goodwin and Milazzo (2015). 
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geography of UK regions are at least as important as culture and identity to determine individual 
attitudes towards the EU and voting patterns at the 2016 Referendum.  
 
Indeed, empirical analyses performing comprehensive investigations of the Brexit vote and 
considering not only demographic and political variables but also proxy variables for local 
economic structure and ‘economic exposure’ to the rest of the European Union, all seem to 
suggest that economic factors have played a significant role. Becker et al. (2016), Arnosson and 
Zoega (2016) and Hobolt (2016) all provided evidence demonstrating that voters’ decisions have 
been clearly conditioned by their level of income, with less well-off citizens and poorer areas 
more likely to support a ‘Leave’ vote. Adding to that, Bell and Machin (2016) and Darvas (2016) 
claimed that wage inequality and poverty are two crucial drivers of Brexit. Clarke et al. (2017) 
demonstrated that economic cost-benefit evaluations are at least as influential as any sense of 
identity. Indeed, Curtice (2017) claims that the perceived impact of leaving the EU on the 
economy is the variable more strongly related to how people voted. Another work accounting for 
both cultural (nationalistic) attitudes and economic motivations is Colantone and Stanig’s (2016) 
in-depth analysis of the impact of trade-related transmission channels from economic 
globalisation into Brexit voting patterns. They suggested that economic integration via trade did 
impact Eurosceptic preferences. More than the actual incidence of migrants into an area, they 
argued, it is globalisation-induced shocks that drove perceptions and attitudes towards 
immigration, and in turn determined voting decisions on Brexit.  
 
Additional evidence on the relevance of socio-economic factors as Brexit determinants is 
reported in the study by Clarke and Whittaker (2016), which showed how labour market 
conditions are crucial in conditioning voters’ choices. Higher employment levels are associated 
with lower propensity towards Leave, suggestive that unemployed people were more prone 
towards Brexit than those with safe salaries and jobs. 
 
Even the result of a link between public support for UKIP and a higher propensity to vote Leave 
can be interpreted in economic terms. While it is true that the UKIP electorate is composed of 
people feeling culturally excluded, it is also true that support for UKIP is high particularly 
among those who have been ‘left behind’ by the economic transformation of Britain in the recent 
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decades (Ford and Goodwin, 2014) and that perceive the process of globalisation of the world 
economy as disadvantageous (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015; Clarke et al., 2016; Goodwin and 
Heath, 2016). Hence, cultural and economic motives are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but 
rather they can be intertwined. 
 
When the ‘internationalisation’ of the economy clashes with cultural 
‘localism’ 
 
The review of the current debates on the factors influencing the outcome of the Referendum 
suggests that neither economic nor cultural arguments alone are sufficient to provide a complete 
picture of the voting patterns on Brexit. What this paper aims to put forward is a more nuanced 
explanation that accounts simultaneously for both economic and cultural aspects that intrinsically 
co-exist and interact in any society. 
 
Purely cultural explanations of the Referendum outcome inevitably rely on the strong assumption 
- as in Goodhart (2017) - that people living in areas such as Bradford, Hull or Sheffield (where 
Leave prevailed) have more connection, devotion or sense of rootedness to their home towns 
than strongly pro-Remain locations such as Manchester, Leeds or Liverpool. Indeed, a large and 
consolidated body of literature on social ties and social capital has shown that the extent to which 
individuals are rooted into a local community is not necessarily in contrast with their attachment 
to other localities and social groups. The way in which individuals combine embeddedness into 
local networks and connectivity with external groups is highly heterogeneous across places and 
communities (Granovetter, 1973; 1982; 1985). 
 
Conversely, explanations based on economic motives are hard to reconcile with some key hard 
facts on the economic geography of the UK and the spatial patterns of the Leave vote. Peripheral 
areas relying more heavily on employment generated by large foreign corporations have 
overwhelmingly supported Brexit. As an example, in the area of Sunderland only about a third of 
people voted Remain despite the presence of a “giant Nissan factory which exports more than 
half its output to the other EU countries” (Begg, 2016: 33). A similar case is East Wales, home 
of a very large Airbus factory and yet favouring Brexit. All these areas seem to have voted 
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against their own economic self-interest. A similar ‘paradox’ is highlighted by Los et al. (2017), 
suggesting that UK regions more economically integrated into the single market – i.e. exporting 
higher shares of their GDP to the EU – were more ‘Eurosceptic’ and disproportionately favoured 
leaving the EU. 
 
Local jobs in many UK regions are highly dependent on foreign economic ties: foreign 
companies are active in local labour markets with their subsidiaries; domestic companies can 
preserve employment levels by off-shoring some of their activities abroad; integration into 
international trade flows is central to the competitive strategies of a large share of local (foreign 
and domestic) firms increasingly more embedded into Global Value Chains. Therefore, while 
‘internationalised firms’ absorb substantial shares of the regional workforce of many UK  
regions, workers, managers and entrepreneurs in some of these regions openly rejected 
internationalisation by voting to rescind their links with the EU, the largest integrated market and 
investment space of the world. 
 
It is precisely by exploring this apparent ‘paradox’ that new insights on the logic of the Brexit 
vote can be gained. In particular, two fundamental dimensions should be taken into account in 
order to assess the degree of internationalisation of the various regional economies from a new 
standpoint. First, internationalisation is determined not only (and not necessarily) by import and 
export flows that have attracted the attention of the existing literature on the economic motives 
of the Brexit Referendum. Domestic workers compete with other workers active in foreign 
locations via the inflow of imported goods (that can be sold on the local market at lower prices 
than domestically supplied alternatives thanks to cheaper inputs) but they might also be 
employed by the local subsidiaries of foreign firms (or by domestic firms with subsidiaries 
abroad). In other words, both foreign and domestic multinationals (i.e. the degree of active and 
passive internationalisation) connect local and ‘global’ labour markets, introducing different and 
new work practices and standards, offering the opportunity to work in more internationalised 
environments, but also fostering competitive pressure on domestic workers.  
 
Second, voters’ decisions are not exclusively influenced by their work-place dynamics, as 
advocated by the literature on the cultural factors behind Brexit. Following Granovetter (1973), 
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social ties can be supported by frequent contacts with deep emotional involvement (‘strong ties’) 
or by sporadic interactions with low emotional commitment (‘weak ties’). ‘Strong ties’ are 
associated with local connections and communication of familiar information and ideas within 
like-minded groups thanks to a set of shared codes, norms and values. Strong ties function as a 
bonding device within homogeneous groups potentially hampering the degree of sociability 
outside closed circles. Conversely, weak ties operate as a bridge between otherwise disconnected 
social groups (Ruef, 2002). Therefore, areas where bonding social capital (Putnam, 2000; 
Rodriguez-Pose and Storper, 2006; Storper, 2005) prevails are less likely to develop a positive 
and synergistic approach with reference to the internationalisation of the economy, hampering 
connections “outside one’s own immediate network or social circle and into new areas of 
information and opportunity” (Cooke et al., 2005). Workers from ‘high bonding social capital’, 
culturally localistic and inward-looking communities are more prone to see employers’ 
internationalisation as a (potential) threat to their economic stability and welfare. These workers 
are more prone to take any occasion to vote ‘against economic integration’ in order to re-align 
the economy to their social preferences. Conversely, workers that are immersed in open and 
outward-oriented local societies are more capable to bridge different social groups, understand 
and embrace a multi-national working environment, maximize the potential learning benefits 
from the international division of labour and constructively cope with interaction and 
competition from foreign workers.  
 
As a result, in order to shed new light on the factors behind the Leave vote, it is necessary to 
cross-fertilise the literature on economic motives of the Brexit vote with the literature on its 
socio-cultural explanations and test the hypothesis that voters immersed in culturally inward-
looking communities responded to the foreign projection of their employers seen as a threat to 
their job security and salary growth rather than as an opportunity for development and long-term 
prosperity. The Brexit referendum offered a unique opportunity to ‘punish’ more outward-
looking employers and – at the same time – reduce the frightening competition from ‘invisible’ 
fellow-workers located in foreign countries exerting a very concrete competitive pressure on 
local labour markets. Following this line of reasoning the result of the Brexit referendum can be 
seen as the result of a process of ‘split Europeanisation’ whereby Euroscepticism is triggered by 
the increasing mismatch - in specific constituencies - between internationalised firms (and 
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corporate economic interests) and ‘localistic’ employees (and workers’ attitudes and cultural 
preferences). 
 
2. Empirical model and data 
 
In order to test the ‘split Europeanisation’ hypothesis discussed above, it is possible to estimate a 
simple local voting equation that predicts the share of ‘Leave votes’ (i.e. the share of votes to 
leave the EU in the 2016 Referendum) in the UK NUTS2
5
 regions as a function of a set of their 
social and economic characteristics that include proxies for the internationalisation of both 
production and society as well as their interaction term. The voting model is specified as a 
simple linear equation to be estimated with OLS where the percentage of Leave votes in the 2016 
EU Referendum by NUTS2 region i.  𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝑖,2016 (with i = 1,2,...,33
6
) is the dependent variable 
and the explanatory variables can be classified as follows: 
 
a) Internationalisation of the economy (FDI and trade) 
The first set of variables of interest is linked to the ‘EU exposure’ of the regional economies and 
their internationalisation not only in terms of trade flows but also, and more importantly, in terms 
of inward and outward FDI flows. Although still in an imperfect and coursed fashion, these 
variables can capture the insertion of the regional economy into global investment flows. To this 
aim, the model considers three different variables: the cumulative value of inward FDI from the 
EU over the 2003-2014 pre-referendum period (𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑖) expressed in US Dollars and in number 
of new jobs created per 1000 inhabitants; the cumulative value of outward FDI from each region 
towards the EU in the same period (𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖); the percentage of exports of an area towards the 
European Union, as in Los et al. (2017) (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖 ). 
                                                     
5
 The NUTS classification system (Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques) is a statistical subdivision of 
European regions administered by Eurostat, which has been established with the purpose of collecting comparable 
data on regional characteristics across time in the EU. The level of NUTS2 regions (i.e. the second smallest units in 
the NUTS classification) has already been employed by previous studies investigating the factors contributing to 
influence the outcome of the Brexit Referendum (Arnosson and Zoega, 2016; Fidrmuc et al., 2016). 
6
 The UK is composed of 37 NUTS2 regions. However, for some key variables of interest data is unavailable for 
Northern Ireland and for the four NUTS2 Scottish regions. Given that for Scotland as a whole the data are 
sometimes available our final sample is made of the 32 NUTS2 regions of England and Wales, plus Scotland. 
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 b) Internationalisation of society  
In order to proxy in a parsimonious way for the degree of internationalisation and social 
openness to foreign cultural linkages of UK regional societies the model relies on two key 
variables: the percentage of voters for the UK Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2015 elections 
(𝑈𝐾𝐼𝑃𝑖 ) and a purpose-built “Cultural openness index” (𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖).  
 
The latter index is a composite indicator that linearly combines the “percentage of UK-born 
whose native language is English who are capable to converse in another foreign language”7 and 
“the expenditures per inhabitant for outbound trips”8. These indicators can be considered – when 
combined – as an overall measure for the cultural internationalisation of voters and their 
international social engagement.  
 
c) ‘Split Europeanisation’ 
The interaction term between inward FDI (the key proxy for economic internationalisation) and 
the ‘cultural openness index’ will make it possible to directly test the hypothesis that – ceteris 
paribus – it is the tension between internationalised economies and localistic (i.e. low in cultural 
openness) societies that may have led many British citizens to vote to leave the EU. 
 
Following the emerging literature on the drivers of the Leave vote in the Brexit referendum, the 
model controls for a set of other possible factors influencing the Referendum result: 
 
d) Demographic factors 
To proxy for age and education, which are presented in the existing work among the most 
important determinants of the vote we use: the percentage of the population aged 20-34 (𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖) 
and the percentage of employed people with tertiary education (𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖). 
                                                     
7
 This indicator does not capture the presence of immigrants or foreigners in the region (this specific aspect is 
controlled for by means of a dedicated variable in the controls). Conversely, this indicator captures the extent to 
which ‘native British citizens’ (i.e. Voters in the Referendum) are able to converse in other languages showing an 
interest and a predisposition for other cultures and countries. 
8
 This variable refers to expenditures within the UK by UK residents making an overseas trip (typically money spent 
at airports or on transport fares). The sources are: UK TSA 2013 (ONS), ONS IO&SUT 2013, Annual Business 
Survey 2013; GB Day Visits Survey 2013; GB Tourism Survey 2013; International Passenger Survey 2013. 
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 e) Economic factors  
To control for unemployment (and economic deprivation more generally), we use the percentage 
of population claiming Job-Seeker Allowance (JSA) benefits (𝑈𝑖) in the period before the 
referendum (2008-2014). The two-year lag between 2014 and the referendum of 2016 helps 
mitigate possible endogeneity issues.  
 
The existing literature suggests that higher unemployment in an area might result in an anti-
globalization sentiment and resentment against the government (supporting ‘Remain’ positions), 
hence increasing the percentage of leave voters. 
 
f) Direct transfers from the EU budget  
The decision to leave the European Union is highly likely to discontinue EU funding in 
particular under the Common Agricultural Policy and the EU Structural Funds. Areas in receipt 
of these funds might be more likely to prefer to remain in the EU in order to keep their current 
level of funding. For voters in these constituencies the cost to leave the EU is – ceteris paribus – 
going to be higher due the loss of EU subsidies. Therefore, it is important to also control for 
areas which have been recipients of EU funds (𝐸𝑈 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖), by including in the model the 
average annual EU structural fund payments in the period before the referendum (2007-2013). 
 
g) Immigration 
As one of the key point used by the ‘Leave’ campaign was the role played by immigration and 
the need to control it, we also included a control for growth of immigrants in the area in the 
period 2001-2011 (𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑖).  
 
Formally, the final model is summarized in Equation (1): 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑖,2016 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑖 +  𝛽2 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖
+  𝛽3(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑖 × 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 ) + 𝛽4 𝑈𝐾𝐼𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝑈𝑖
+ 𝛽8 𝐸𝑈 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽9 𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔 + 𝛽10 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽11 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
(1) 
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Throughout the analysis standard errors are clustered at the NUTS1 level, corresponding to UK 
Government Office Regions, in order to mitigate issues of spatial autocorrelation
9
.  
 
In order to build the database required for the analysis, we combined a large number of different 
data sources on the economy and society of the UK regions. Table 1 summarizes the variables 
and their sources.  
Table 1 
Variables used in the analysis and their sources  
Variable Proxy for Description Source 
FDIIN 
Insertion in Global Production 
Networks in terms of Inward FDI 
and trade flows from Europe 
Annual average $ of inward FDI per capita from 
Europe during 2003-2014. 
FDI Markets 
FDIOUT 
Insertion in Global Production 
Networks in terms of Outward 
FDI and trade flows towards 
Europe 
Annual average $ of outward FDI per capita towards 
Europe during 2003-2014. 
FDI Markets 
Trade Trade exposure to the EU Percentage of regional GDP exported to the EU. Los et al. (2017) 
Openness 
Degree of international social 
engagement of UK citizens 
Index constructed on the basis of 2 variables, using 
the standard deviation from the means: 
1. UK-born whose native language is English 
capable to converse in other language (2001) 
2. Log of £ of expenditures per UK  inhabitant for 
outbound overseas  trips (2013) 
 
Note: data only available for NUTS2 Welsh and 
English regions and for Scotland as a whole. 
British 
Household 
Panel Survey 
(BHPS) ; 
National Travel 
Survey 
UKIP 
General consolidate attitude 
towards the EU  
Percentage of UKIP voters at the 2015 National 
elections 
UK Electoral 
Commission 
Age Regional demographic structure 
Percentage of regional population 20-34 year old 
(2013). 
Eurostat 
Educ Educational attainments 
Percentage of employed people holding tertiary 
education degree (2008-2014 average). 
Eurostat 
U 
Labour market and economic 
conditions prior to the Brexit 
vote 
Percentage of regional population claiming JSA 
unemployment benefits (2008-2014 average). 
Nomis dataset 
EU funds 
Regional investments financed 
through EU funds 
Average annual EU Structural Fund Payments during 
the 2007-2013 EU programming period per inhabitant. 
DG Regional 
Policy, 
European 
Commission 
Immig 
Migration patterns towards UK 
regions prior to the Brexit vote 
Growth of migrants from outside the UK between 
2001 and 2011. 
 
Note: only available for Welsh and English regions. 
UK Census 
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 Clustering at NUTS1 level in our analysis implies relying only on 11 clusters. We select this geographical level of 
clustering because it is more representative of UK functional economic areas than NUTS2 regions. As an example, 
NUTS1 correspond to the full territory of three UK Home Nations: Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. 
However, adopting NUTS2 instead of NUTS1 geographical units for the clustering leaves the main results of the 
analysis unchanged (regression results available upon request). 
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3. Results and discussion 
 
3.1. The geography of the drivers of the ‘Leave vote’: economic 
internationalisation and cultural openness  
 
Before presenting the results of the OLS estimation of equation (1), it is worth looking at how 
our key explanatory variables relate to the Brexit vote and whether or not they corroborate our 
hypothesis on the role of ‘split Europeneanisation’.  
 
Figures 1 and 2 show descriptive maps and scatterplot correlations of UK regions by level of 
‘cultural openness’, as defined by our index, the proportion of inward FDI, and the voting 
outcomes at the 2016 Referendum. Panel A in Figure 1 shows that the highest degree of 
social/cultural openess is found in the South West of the country, which includes some of the 
regions where Remain obtained the majority of votes (Inner London, Outer London, Surrey and 
West Sussex). Although high values of the index are also visible in Essex, where Leave won by a 
very large margin, on average the relationship between these two variables is negative. As shown 
by the slope of the regression line in Panel A of Figure 2, higher levels of cultural openness 
(areas where people were either speaking another language or spending more money to travel 
abroad) had on average a lower percentage of Leave voters. 
 
Panel B of Figure 1 illustrates the geographical distribution of FDI from European countries to 
UK NUTS2 regions, in correspondence with the Referendum results in the same regions. In this 
case, it is harder to distinguish a clear pattern. Some pro-Remain regions like London and 
Scotland received relatively large proportions of foreign investments, but so did pro-Leave areas 
such as Cumbria. Panel B of Figure 2 reports a weak negative correlation between these two 
variables. 
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Figure 1 
Cultural openness, inward FDI from Europe, and Leave votes: maps of the UK regions 
Panel A
 
Panel B
 
 
Figure 2 
Cultural openness, inward FDI from Europe, and Leave votes: scatterplot correlations 
Panel A 
 
Panel B
 
Note: Region codes correspond to NUTS2 codes. Outliers: UKI1 is ‘Inner London’; UKD1 is ‘Cumbria10’; UKM0 is ‘Scotland’. 
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 The very high proportion of inward FDI recorded in Cumbria is due to a single large investment by Spanish 
company 'Iberdrola' in 2008 for a total value of 2565 mm$. Given that FDI are standardised by population and that 
Cumbria has only 500,000 inhabitants, this makes it the region with most investment pc. In absolute terms, London 
has received a much higher investment, 23,828mm$ in total for 2003-2014. Cumbria received 4,7837mm$ in the 
same period. 
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4.2 Results  
 
Although the bivariate correlations depicted in the scatterplots in section 4.1 are informative, 
they cannot be taken at face value. The effect of all possible determinants of the Brexit vote need 
to be evaluated jointly to draw more sound conclusions. We do so in our empirical model. Table 
2 presents the results of our estimations starting from the first variable of interest – the cultural 
openness as a proxy for the international engagement of the society, particularly towards 
Europe
11
 – followed by Inward FDI as a proxy for the internationalisation of the regional 
economy and their interaction term. Columns 4 to 10 progressively include the full set of 
controls. A set of robustness tests are included in the Appendix. 
 
 
 
                                                     
11
 The fact that many UK citizens speak South Asian or African languages as their second languages may imply that 
the ‘cultural openness’ index is inaccurate in reflecting the level of ‘Europeanisation’ in the society. To avoid that 
issue, we replicate the analysis by controlling for the percentage of regional population of Asian and African origin 
(measured in 2001). The results, available upon request, are not qualitatively different from the ones reported in the 
paper.   
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Table 2 
Internationalisation of the society, internationalisation of the economy, and Brexit   
Dep. Variable: percentage of Leave votes (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
                       
Cultural openness index -2.487** -2.634*** -1.154* -0.757** -0.772** -0.552 -0.568 -0.631* -0.587 -0.532 -0.354 
 
(0.968) (0.749) (0.635) (0.320) (0.319) (0.316) (0.336) (0.327) (0.355) (0.334) (0.323) 
Inward European FDI per capita (million $)  
-0.0155* -0.0164*** -0.00369 -0.00303 -0.00301* -0.00292* -0.00266 -0.00265 -0.00377 -0.00692** 
 
 
(0.00843) (0.00499) (0.00259) (0.00269) (0.00158) (0.00160) (0.00175) (0.00183) (0.00231) (0.00302) 
(Inward Eur FDI) x (Cultural openness index)   
-0.00665*** -0.00362*** -0.00262*** -0.00182** -0.00174** -0.00164** -0.00155* -0.00168* -0.00312** 
 
  
(0.00136) (0.000694) (0.000765) (0.000657) (0.000704) (0.000683) (0.000688) (0.000814) (0.00109) 
% votes for UKIP at 2015 elections    
1.336*** 1.317*** 1.222*** 1.225*** 1.199*** 1.176*** 1.147*** 1.158*** 
 
   
(0.0524) (0.0542) (0.0589) (0.0560) (0.0484) (0.102) (0.116) (0.123) 
20-34 year old population     
-0.217* -0.672** -0.735** -0.827** -0.799** -0.697** -0.849** 
 
    
(0.118) (0.259) (0.283) (0.264) (0.292) (0.290) (0.323) 
Unemployment benefit claimants      
2.129* 2.267** 2.676** 2.263 2.320* 2.678* 
 
     
(1.010) (1.000) (1.020) (1.293) (1.198) (1.250) 
Employed people with tertiary education       
0.0216 0.0288 0.0185 0.0137 0.0123 
 
      
(0.0417) (0.0360) (0.0544) (0.0453) (0.0472) 
EU funds per inhabitant        
-0.0137 -0.0149 -0.0111 -0.0107 
 
       
(0.00835) (0.00911) (0.00825) (0.00886) 
Growth of migrants from outside the UK          
1.489 1.353 2.114 
 
        
(3.165) (3.100) (3.165) 
Percentage of exports towards the EU           
0.352 0.432 
 
         
(0.392) (0.391) 
Outward European FDI per capita            
 0.00297 
 
         
 (0.00166) 
Constant 54.24*** 57.11*** 57.12*** 35.64*** 40.01*** 45.67*** 45.73*** 47.16*** 47.26*** 42.34*** 43.15*** 
 
(1.029) (1.438) (1.018) (1.193) (2.601) (3.508) (3.410) (3.296) (3.589) (7.385) (7.313) 
Observations 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 32 32 32 
R-squared 0.312 0.434 0.551 0.925 0.928 0.948 0.948 0.952 0.945 0.947 0.949 
Clustered standard errors at NUTS1 level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 18 
The degree of internationalisation of the local society – proxied by the cultural openness index – 
is associated with a statistically significant reduction in the share of voters supporting the UK 
departure from the European Union (column 1). This relationship becomes even stronger when 
the internationalisation of the economy is accounted for by adding inward FDI to the model 
(column 2). The presence of foreign firms in the local economy also reduces the propensity to 
vote leave, although the coefficient is only marginally significant.  However, what seems to be 
the most important factor to shape local preference for EU membership is the interaction 
between the economic and the social sphere: the interaction term between the cultural openness 
index and inward FDI (column 3) is negative and highly significant, suggesting a strong 
complementarity between these two dimensions. The incidence of leave votes is minimized in 
areas where both the local economy and society are jointly internationalised. The two 
internationalisation variables and their interaction term alone can account for more than 50% of 
the overall regional variability in the EU referendum voting patterns.  
 
The progressive introduction of additional control variables – to be assessed with caution given 
the limited number of total observations – confirms this overall message. The interaction 
between social and economic internationalisation remains a robust predictor of the share of leave 
votes in all specifications, confirm the initial working hypothesis of this paper. Contrary to the 
initial claims by some commentators the economy does matter to explain voting patterns in the 
Brexit referendum but it counts the most when interacting with societal attitudes and preferences.  
 
The introduction of additional controls unveils additional interesting features of the geography of 
the Brexit referendum. First, although the magnitude of the coefficient decreases as more 
variables are included in the model, the percentage of UKIP voters in 2015 is a strong predictor 
of the Brexit vote. Obviously this variable picks up some cultural and political values that are 
unrelated to all the other variables included in the model, such as age, education, but also cultural 
openness.  
 
Second, as for the demographic variables, age is a strong predictor of the Brexit vote. Even after 
controlling for all different factors, the effect of age holds strong. This means that if we take two 
individuals, identical in terms of cultural openness, unemployment, education and so on, living 
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in areas identical in terms of EU funds received, export to the EU and FDIs, the younger 
individual would still be more likely than the older individual to vote in favour of Europe. This 
confirms what all the major commentators were reporting in the days after Brexit, despite the 
fact that they were presenting rather simplistic analyses. However, our proxy for education (i.e. 
the percentage of workers with tertiary education) is never significant, showing that, once other 
factors are controlled for, the differential effect of education is negligible.  
 
Third, despite the focus on immigration in the period before the Brexit referendum, the growth of 
immigrants in an area in the decade 2001-2011, inserted from column 9, is not significantly 
related to the proportion of leave votes. The coefficient of the variable is positive, coherently 
with the existing descriptive literature documenting a positive association between the increase 
in migrants and the Leave share (Coyle, 2016; Carozzi, 2016; Clark & Whittaker, 2016). 
However, the inclusion of other factors influencing the vote in our model makes it always 
insignificant, meaning it did not influence the vote one way or another. This finding contradicts 
the popular idea that a growth in immigration could spur an anti-EU sentiment.  However, in 
interpreting this result a deeper reflection is needed. Among their results Harris and Charlton 
(2017) also found that certain groups such as Pakistani and Indians were more likely to vote to 
leave Europe. In the 2016 referendum the most penalized were the European immigrants who 
never felt the necessity to get a UK citizenship (and hence could not vote). Most immigrants 
coming from outside the EU eventually took the British citizenship and could therefore vote in 
the referendum. They might have also played a role in supporting Brexit.  
 
Lastly, areas which receive a larger share of EU structural funds were, indeed, neither more nor 
less likely to vote for the EU, as shown by the insignificance of the estimated coefficient. The 
result of an insignificant impact of Cohesion Policy on the Brexit outcome, already reported by 
other studies (Becker et al., 2016; Fidrmuc et al., 2016; Crescenzi et al., 2017), can have multiple 
explanations. One possibility is that EU subsidies have not contributed to spread pro-Europe 
feelings in the most highly funded areas because they have been perceived by some voters as a 
form of foreign dependence (Davies, 2016). A different interpretation is that EU funds had no 
influence on voting outcomes simply because large sections of UK voters were entirely unaware 
of the contribution or scale of EU financial support to their regions. This view is corroborated by 
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the results of a recent EU opinion poll, finding that less than one in ten UK citizens knew about 
EU-financed projects in the area they live (European Commission, 2015). 
 
The same is true for trade flows: they received a lot of attention following the Referendum 
results but they are not robust predictors of the referendum results after carefully controlling for 
other features of the regional economies. The off-shoring of domestic activities abroad (outward 
FDI) is also not significant in the fully specified model
12
. The only key economic factors that 
seems to be correlated with regional leave votes is unemployment. Areas with higher 
unemployment did vote “leave” significantly more than others and this result is robust 
throughout the different model specifications. Economic conditions, at least in terms of 
unemployment, did matter in defining the outcome of the referendum. 
 
A number of robustness tests are performed in order to confirm the conditional correlations 
discussed above. The additional regressions are reported in the Appendix. In particular the sign 
and significance of the key regressors is confirmed after excluding London from the sample. 
London is a consider as a major outlier in the UK (and European economy) in terms of its 
internationalisation (‘global city’) as well as in terms of its economic and social composition and 
voting patterns (Londoners overwhelmingly voted to remain in the EU). Regressions are also re-
estimated with alternative proxies for FDI, using the number of jobs created rather than the dollar 
value of the investments as proxy for internationalisation (Table A3). This alternative 
specification confirms the key result of the analysis, i.e. the mitigation of anti-EU feelings in 
presence of more internationalised people and places. 
 
 
4. Conclusions  
 
Some commentators have quickly (possibly too quickly) dismissed economic factors as relevant 
explanations for the success of the ‘leave’ vote in many UK regions. Cultural, demographic (age 
                                                     
12
 When we include outward FDI in the model we may incur in collinearity issues, due to the correlation of this 
variable with inward FDI. Indeed, as the VIF test is performed (reported in Table A2 in the Appendix), some 
evidence of collinearity emerges, although the regression results on the key variables of interest remain unchanged 
when all variables are included (column 11). 
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and concentration of foreign migrants) and human capital (education) explanations have 
dominated the debate, often relegating pro-Brexit support to ageing and poorly educated groups 
and areas. Conversely, economic narratives have pointed their attention toward the discontent 
generated by the process of globalization via international trade flows. This paper has taken a 
different approach by exploring the middle ground between economic and cultural explanations 
and looking at the interaction between economic and social factors as the most promising avenue 
to answer the question “why has this happened?”  
 
First, the paper has developed more comprehensive proxies for the degree of economic and 
cultural integration of the UK regions. The former has been captured by taking into account the 
role of FDI: while free trade is largely possible under WTO rules, full capital mobility is indeed a 
feature of the Single Market. The latter has been captured by means of a ‘cultural openness’ 
index hat captures the cultural internationalisation of British voters in a way that is independent 
from migration inflows. Second, our work has explored the tension between the 
internationalisation of the regional economy and the internationalisation of the underlying 
society as a possible predictor of the propensity to support the UK departure from the European 
Union. The robustness of this possible interpretation of the electoral data has been tested against 
alternative hypotheses developed in the media and academic debate on the topic.  
 
The basic analysis of the correlation between Leave votes and internationalisation proxies 
suggests that both exposure to FDI and cultural/social openness reduce the share of anti-EU 
votes. However, the stronger predictor for Euroscepticism is the interaction between these two 
dimensions: regions where the presence of foreign firms is not coupled by the propensity of local 
workers to interact with foreign cultures are more likely to vote ‘Leave’. In other words, if 
internationalisation in the workplace is not coupled by internationalisation ‘at home’, it tends to 
increase the pressure on local workers to vote out from further economic integration. This 
explanation of the geography of the Brexit vote is robust to the inclusion of a number of controls 
as proxies for other influencing factors. The propensity of elderly voters to support Brexit is 
confirmed by our analysis, together with the share of UKIP votes in the previous political 
elections as a measure for a-priori anti-EU sentiments in the local population. Unemployment is 
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the single most important economic factor correlating with Leave votes, on top of our measures 
for internationalisation.  
 
The analysis presented in the paper suffers from a number of limitations. The EU Referendum is 
a one-off event that makes it impossible to include any time dimension to the analysis. This 
makes ‘unobservable’ factors a significant challenge to any quantitative analysis of the electoral 
data. Even if the empirical model takes into account a large number of variables – mitigating this 
potential problem – the limited number of observations (all UK NUTS2 English and Welsh 
regions, plus Scotland) inevitably constraints the number of regressors. In addition the results 
can only be interpreted as conditional correlations without any causal message. In addition our 
hypothesis about split Europeanisation would be better tested by means of micro-level individual 
employer-employee matched data that would make it possible to exactly link the workplace 
internationalisation of each individual with their cultural orientation. However, unfortunately, 
these data are very hard to obtain and – as the unpredictability of the referendum results has 
shown – difficult to link to actual voting decisions (for example vs. responses to hypothetical 
questions on attitudes towards the EU). 
 
Having acknowledged these limitations, the paper still offers relevant descriptive insights on the 
localised factors behind the Brexit vote. It offers – together with other contributions in this 
emerging stream of political economy research – material for discussion on the lessons to be 
learnt from the UK experience on how to ensure the political sustainability of the process of 
European integration. Dismissing economic factors behind anti-EU voting patterns can lead to 
misleading actions and policies. Inclusive labour markets remain important conditions for an 
equitable distribution of the benefits from the process of integration. However, even in high-
employment countries like the UK, the intensified role of global investment flows and value 
chains in the economic tissue of EU countries and regions – in particular in the form of the 
increased presence of foreign firms operating across national borders – poses major societal 
challenges. If social and cultural attitudes towards integration and internationalisation are not 
developed in parallel with the globalization of the economy, tensions are very likely to arise.  
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Table A1  
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Percentage of Leave votes 33 54.247 7.413 
Inward European FDI per capita (million $) 33 185.5 168.1 
Cultural openness index components: 
   
Capacity to converse in other language 33 0.237 0.089 
Log £ for outbound trips per capita 33 4.891 1.280 
Cultural openness index 33 -0.002 1.665 
Percentage of votes for UKIP at 2015 elections 33 14.367 4.005 
Percentage of 20-34 year old population 33 19.287 3.219 
Employed people with tertiary education 33 37.225 9.848 
Percentage of unemployment benefit claimants 33 2.106 0.682 
Growth of migrants from outside the UK (2001-2011) 32 0.663 0.265 
Annual average EU funds per inhabitant (2007-2013) 33 32.702 39.974 
Percentage of exports towards the EU 33 10.245 1.495 
Outward European FDI per capita  (2003-2014) 33 148.1 411.2 
Inward European FDI jobs created per capita  33 0.339 0.283 
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Table A2 
VIF test 
 
with Outward FDI 
(column 11) 
Without Outward FDI 
(column 10) 
Variable VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF 
Cultural openness index 3.35 0.298 2.35 0.425 
% votes for UKIP at 2015 elections 1.9 0.527 1.88 0.532 
Percentage of 20-34 year old population 11.52 0.086 8.78 0.113 
Employed people with tertiary education 2.55 0.392 2.54 0.393 
Percentage of unemployment benefit claimants 4.91 0.203 4.22 0.236 
Growth of migrants from outside the UK 2.84 0.351 2.39 0.418 
Annual average EU funds per inhabitant 1.52 0.658 1.52 0.659 
Percentage of exports towards the EU 2.49 0.402 2.33 0.429 
Inward European FDI per capita (million $) 4.72 0.211 1.59 0.627 
Outward European FDI per capita  17.08 0.058   
(Inward Eur FDI) x (Cultural openness index) 10.71 0.093 4.01 0.249 
Mean VIF 5.78 3.16 
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Table A3 
Robustness tests – Inner London excluded 
Dep. Variable: percentage of Leave votes (1) (2) 
      
Cultural openness index -0.103 -0.106 
 
(0.379) (0.535) 
Inward European FDI per capita (million $) -0.0112** 
 
 
(0.00469) 
 
(Inward Eur FDI) x (Cultural openness index) -0.00519** 
 
 
(0.00176) 
 
% votes for UKIP at 2015 elections 1.121*** 1.073*** 
 
(0.0996) (0.121) 
20-34 year old population -1.077*** -0.835** 
 
(0.294) (0.336) 
Unemployment benefit claimants 3.093** 2.808** 
 
(1.296) (1.114) 
Employed people with tertiary education 0.0295 -0.00123 
 
(0.0406) (0.0526) 
EU funds per inhabitant -0.0143 -0.0156 
 
(0.00826) (0.00964) 
Growth of migrants from outside the UK 1.922 0.950 
 
(2.765) (3.408) 
Percentage of exports towards the EU  0.389 0.414* 
 
(0.327) (0.206) 
Outward European FDI per capita   -0.00114 -0.00218 
 
(0.00171) (0.00412) 
Inward European FDI jobs created per capita    -3.663 
 
  (2.068) 
(Inward Eur FDI jobs) x (Cultural openness index)   -3.081* 
 
  (1.425) 
Constant 48.03*** 45.81*** 
 
(6.009) (7.009) 
Observations 31 31 
R-squared 0.918 0.927 
Clustered standard errors at NUTS1 level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Inner 
London observation excluded in both specifications. 
  
